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Abstract
In this paper we study the optimal monetary and fiscal policies of a general equilibrium
model of unemployment and money with search frictions both in labor and goods markets
as in Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2010). We abstract from revenue-raising motives to
focus on the welfare-enhancing properties of optimal policies. We show that some of the
inefficiencies in the Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2010) framework can be restored with
appropriate fiscal policies. In particular, when lump sum monetary transfers are possible,
a production subsidy financed by money printing can increase output in the decentralized
market and a vacancy subsidy financed by a dividend tax even when the Hosios’ rule does
not hold.
JEL Classification: E52, E63.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between inflation and unemployment has been extensively analyzed over the
past fifty years. One of the most robust monetary features of post-war U.S. data is its positive
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correlation. Many economists view this as an important tool for the conduct of monetary policy.
Understanding the origins of the correlations associated with the Phillips curve is a crucial first
step to understand the implications of that relationship when designing optimal policies. One
thus needs to specify the economic environment where agents make choices regarding their
labor supply and savings decisions; linking labor and money markets.
Given that agents interacting in frictionless Walrasian markets do not require money for
their transactions and are always employed, models with frictions are key in understanding the
relationships between unemployment and inflation.1 Despite the growing use of search the-
oretic models of unemployment to study the Phillips curve, little is known about the nature of
optimal fiscal and monetary policies in these class of models. An exception is that of Cooley and
Quadrini (2004) who study optimal monetary policy in a model that integrates the modern the-
ory of unemployment with firms facing cash-in-advance constraints to purchase the interme-
diate input. These authors show that when the economy is subject to productivity shocks, the
optimal policy is pro-cyclical and with commitment the optimal inflation rate is inversely re-
lated to the bargaining power of workers. Within the search theoretic models models of money,
Lehmann’s (2006) shows that the optimal monetary growth rate decreases with the workers’ bar-
gaining power, the level of unemployment benefits and the payroll tax rate. Finally, Berentsen,
Rocheteau and Shi (2007) studies optimal monetary policy in an economy with endogenous
search decisions. They show that the same frictions that give fiat money a positive value gen-
erate an inefficient quantity of goods in each trade and an inefficient number of trades. The
Friedman rule eliminates the first inefficiency and the Hosios rule the second. A monetary
equilibrium attains the social optimum if and only if both rules are satisfied. When they cannot
be satisfied simultaneously, optimal monetary policy achieves only the second best.
In this paper we follow the tradition of search theoretic models of money and unemploy-
ment and study the design of optimal monetary and fiscal policies. The underlying environ-
ment is based on search frictions in labor and goods markets as in Berentsen, Menzio and
Wright (2010). We abstract from revenue-raising motives to focus on the welfare-enhancing
properties of optimal policy. Our analysis considers alternative fiscal instruments to study the
following issues. First, can fiscal and monetary policy restore efficiency of equilibria? Is the
1For instance, within a fully flexible cash in advance framework, Cooley and Quadrini (1999) integrate a model
of equilibrium unemployment. When price rigidities are considered, Walsh (2003), among others, studies the rela-
tionship between inflation and unemployment. When search theoretic models of money are considered, Lehmann
(2006), Kumar (2008) and Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2010), among others explore the relationship between
inflation and unemployment. None of these papers examine the corresponding optimal fiscal and monetary poli-
cies.
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Friedman rule an optimal policy once unemployment exists and fiscal policy is available?
The environment we consider has three sources of inefficiency. First, in monetary exchanges
agents pay a cost today (production) to receive a future benefit (money that can be used to pur-
chase goods in future trades); i.e., the intertemporal distortion present in most monetary mod-
els. The second one is a direct consequence of the properties of Nash’s solution to the bargain-
ing problem when agents trade goods for money. Finally, the third source of inefficiency derives
from the matching frictions in the labor market.2 The existence of these inefficiencies motivates
our work in designing fiscal and monetary policies that can attenuate them. The Friedman rule
eliminates the intertemporal one and attenuates the impact of bargaining inefficiencies. How-
ever, equilibrium allocations are not efficient without active fiscal policies. Hence, we propose
different fiscal and monetary policies that can restore efficiency of monetary equilibrium.
In this paper, by establishing a search-theoretical model of money and unemployment, we
find the following policy implications:
• Production subsidies, paid in money, can be used to increase production in the decen-
tralized market but they may be inflationary. If costless lump-sum monetary transfers
are available, these can be used to extract the money introduced through the subsidy
and thus inflation can be easily contained. In this environment, we find multiple com-
binations of taxes, subsidies, and (sometimes strictly positive) inflation rates such that
efficiency is attained.
• The optimal fiscal and monetary policy are used to resort efficiency in both labor market
and goods market. A simple combination of production subsidy s ∗q and inflation rate
pi∗ can help to achieve efficiency in good market. When both Hosios’ rule and a similar
"contribution-compensating" rule are hold, this simple policy combination implements
efficiency in both markets. However, s ∗q can deteriorate the inefficiency in labor market.
In this case, other fiscal policies are required.
• If government wants a larger vacancy-unemployment ratio θ = v
u
, the government can
either raise firms’ incentive to recruit, or lower unemployment workers’ welfare, or do
both. When the vacancy-unemployment ratio is higher than efficient level, government
may want to tax firms or subsidize the unemployed.
The findings of this paper confirm the observation by Kocherlakota (2005) and Wright (2005)
that fiscal and monetary policies may have important interactions, particularly in frameworks
2As shown in Hosios (1990), if the worker’s share of the matching surplus is too small, there will be an excessive
creation of vacancies due to the high profitability of a match for the firm.
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with microeconomic foundations for the existence of fiat money, and should always be jointly
considered in the design of optimal government policy.
2 Model
Time is discrete and continues forever. There are two types of agents, firms and households,
indexed by f and h. The set of households denoted by h belong to the [0,1] interval, the set of
firms denoted by f is arbitrarily large, but not all are active at any point in time. Households
work, consume, and enjoy utility while firms maximize profits and pay dividends.
In each period, there are three distinct markets where economic activity takes place: a la-
bor market in the spirit of Mortensen-Pissarides, a specialized goods market in the spirit of
Kiyotaki-Wright, and a general market in the spirit of Arrow-Debreu. We refer these submarkets
as LM, DM and CM, respectively.
The timing of the environment is such that LM convenes first, then DM, and finally CM. In
the first subperiod agents enter the labor market with different employment status. Note that
in the LM market, h and f can match bilaterally to create a job. To denote the outcome of that
bilateral meeting we have an index, e , that represents the employment status: e = 1 if an agent
is matched and e = 0 otherwise. Employed workers are matched with firms to produce output
y , while unemployed workers do not produce. After the labor market takes place, both types of
workers (employed and unemployed) enter into the next submarket, DM, where they purchase
the goods that have been just produced. In the final subperiod, employed (unemployed) work-
ers receive their wage payments (unemployment benefits), as well as dividend income from
firms. Through exchanges in a Walrasian market, workers acquire consumption of a general
good and rebalance their currency to carry into the next period.
We define a value function for LM, DM and CM submarkets as U je (z ), V
j
e (z ), W
j
e (z ) respec-
tively, which depend on type j ∈ {h, f }, employment status e ∈ {0, 1} and real money balances
z ∈ [0,∞), where z =m/p and p is the current price level. As in Berentsen, Menzio and Wright
(2010) we adopt the following convention for measuring real balances. When an agent brings in
m dollars to the CM, the agent then takes zˆ = mˆ/p out of that market and into the next period.
In the next CM market the price level is pˆ , so the real value of the money is zˆ ρˆ, where ρˆ = p/pˆ
converts zˆ into units of the numeraire general consumption good X in that market.
In addition to firms and households, there exists a government who conducts monetary and
fiscal policies. In the CM, the government collects labor income taxes and dividend taxes to
finance vacancy subsidies and unemployment benefits. The government also conducts mone-
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Figure 1: Timing.
tary policy by printing money at different times of the day. In particular, at the end of the DM,
the government provides a monetary production subsidy. On the other hand, at the end of CM,
new money is injected through a lump-sum transfer (or tax). See Figure 1 for the exact timing.
2.1 Household’s Problem
We now examine households’ value functions in each of the subperiods, starting with the final
one. A household that enters the CM with employment status, e , and real money holdings, z ,
chooses consumption and real money holdings for next period, zˆ , to solve the following prob-
lem:
W he (z ) =maxX ,zˆ
{X +(1− e )l +βU he (zˆ )}
s.t. X = e w (1−τl )+ (1− e )b+Í (1−τd )+ z − zˆ +τz ;
where X is the general CM consumption good, l represents leisure,Í denotes dividend income,
b is the unemployment benefit,τl denotes the labor income tax rate,τd represents the dividend
income tax rate, and τz is the real lump-sum real monetary transfers.
Substituting X into the objective function we obtain the following simplified problem:
W he (z ) =maxzˆ
{e w (1−τl )+ (1− e )(l +b )+Í (1−τd )+ z − zˆ +τz +βU he (zˆ )}. (1)
As in Lagos and Wright (2005), with quasi-linear preferences the optimal choice of future real
balances, zˆ , is independent of the current ones, z . It depends, however, on the workers’ em-
ployment status e . To determine this link let us now explore the problem of a representative
household in the DM which is given by:
V he (z ) =αhν (q )+αh W
h
e (ρ(z −d ))+ (1−αh)W he (ρz ) (2)
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where ν (q ) denotes the utility that a buyer obtains when consumes q units of the specialized
DM good, ρ = p/pˆ and αh is the probability of trading. The probability of trade is given by a
matching function αh=M (B ,S)/B , where B and S are the measures of buyers and sellers in the
market. AssumingM (B ,S) satisfies the constant returns scale property, αh=M (Q , 1)/Q , where
Q = B/S is the queue length or market tightness. All households participate in the DM market,
so B = 1; only firms with e = 1 participate, so S = 1− u where u is unemployment. Thus,
αh=M (1, 1−u ).
Now exploiting the linearity of W he (z ), we can rewrite the DM value function as follows:
V he (z ) =αh[ν (q )−ρd ]+W he (0)+ρz . (3)
To close the household problem we need to specify the choices of the representative house-
hold in the LM which are characterized by:
U he=1(z ) =V
h
1 (z )+δ[V
h
0 (z )−V h1 (z )] (4)
and
U he=0(z ) =V
h
0 (z )+λh[V
h
1 (z )−V h0 (z )];
where δ denotes the exogenous rate at which matches are destroyed and λh is the endogenous
rate at which they are created. The latter is determined by another standard matching function,
λh =N (u , v )/u , where u is unemployment and v is the number of vacancies posted by firms.
Implicit in this set up is that wages are determined when f and h meet in the LM, although
they are paid in the next CM market. Moreover, wages can be renegotiated each period.
Now that all the value functions for the different submarkets have been specified, the prob-
lem of the representative household can be rewritten as follows:
W he (z ) = Ie + z +maxzˆ
{−zˆ +βαh[ν (q )−ρd ]+βρzˆ }+βEW he (0) (5)
where Ie = e w (1−τl )+(1−e )(l +b )+Í (1−τd )+τz andEW he (0) is the expectation with respect
to next period’s employment status.
2.2 Firm’s Problem
Firms carry no real balance out of CM. The problem of a firm in the LM is given by
U fe=1(z ) =V
f
1 (z )+δ[V
f
0 (z )−V f1 (z )] (6)
and
U fe=0(z ) =V
f
0 (z )+λ f [V
f
1 (z )−V f0 (z )];
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whereλ f is the endogenous rate at which matches are created which is given byλ f =N (u , v )/v .
By constant returns, λ f =N (u /v, 1), where v /u is labor market tightness.
In the first subperiod, firms with e = 0 have no production activities. If a firm enters the LM
with a job match, it can produce y units of output in the LM which can then be sold in the DM,
with a probability α f =αhQ with Q = B/S. The problem of the firm in the DM is given by:
V f1 (z ) =α f W
f
1 (y − c (q ),ρd (1+ sq ))+ (1−α f )W f1 (y , 0) (7)
where sq is the monetary subsidy to production in DM and c (q ) is opportunity cost of a sale. As
in Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2010) we assume that c (q ) units of CM good are transferred
into q units of DM good so that y − c (q ) units of general good will be carried to the next CM
market. Thus one could interpret x and q as the same physical good that a firm can store across
markets, bearing in mind that consumers generally value it differently in the two markets.
The CM value of a firm with inventory ,x , real money balances, z , and wage commitment,
w , is given by:
W f1 (x , z ) = x + z −w +βU f1 . (8)
Thus the DM value of a firm is given by:
V f1 (z ) =R −w +β [δV f0 +(1−δ)V f1 ] (9)
where R = y +α f [(1+ sq )ρd − c (q )] is the expected revenue.
To model entry, any firm with e = 0 can pay k , in units of X , in the CM to enter the next labor
market. Thus we have that:
W f0 =max{0,−k +a +βλ f V f1 +β (1−λ f )V f0 } (10)
where a denotes the vacancy subsidy that the government gives to firms. The free entry condi-
tion then implies that k−a =βλ f V f1 . Now taking into account equation (9), the entry condition
becomes:
k −a = βλ f (R −w )
1−β (1−δ) .
The resulting profits over all firms are then given by:
eΠ= (1−u )(R −w )−v k +v a .
Since households own shares of all firms, profits define the dividend payment: eΠ=Í.
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2.3 The Government
In this environment, the government’s available monetary and fiscal policy tools are used to
attenuate the frictions in the economic environment. The government pays unemployment
benefits, b , and vacancy subsidies, a , which are financed through labor taxes, τl , and dividend
taxes, τd , in the CM market. Thus the fiscal budget constraint is given by:
v a +u b =τd Í+α f τl w
which holds at every date.
Following Gomis-Porqueras and Peralta-Alva (2010), the monetary authority injects money
at different times within a period to finance a production subsidy, sq , in the DM as well as to
affect the money supply at the end of CM. Thus the corresponding monetary budget constrains
is given by
α f sqq =τDM z
(1+τDM )(1+τC M ) = 1+pi
whereτDM (τDM ) correspond to the DM (CM) money growth rate andpi equals the inflation rate
in steady state.
The monetary production subsidy we consider can be mapped in real-life economies to
policies that prescribe paying interest to some money holders, in our case firms. This type of
policy prescription has a long tradition in monetary economics and has been advocated by Tol-
ley (1957) and Friedman (1959), among others. Regarding the feasibility and implementability
of this policy, Feinman (1993) notes that the Federal Reserve has explicitly supported legislation
authorizing the payment of interest on reserves since the 1970s. Our paper then re-examines
an established monetary policy prescription in the new search models of money.
3 Pricing Mechanisms
To characterize the terms of trade, we need to specify the trading protocols in each of the three
markets. Following the standard specifications in the literature, we consider price taking in the
CM and Nash bilateral bargaining in LM and DM submarkets. Although one can easily modify
the model to allow other pricing options. The reason for this choice is that we can use seller’s
bargaining power as a proxy for the degree of competition in the goods market, and examine
how different market structures affect the implied inflation-unemployment relation.
8
3.1 Nash Bargaining in DM
Suppose that when a worker and firm meet in the DM, they bargain over the terms of trade
(q , d ), subject to the worker’s cash constraint d ≤ z , where d is the amount of real money bal-
ances the buyer gives to the seller in exchange for q . Letφ denote the seller’s bargaining power.
The trading protocol in DM is the generalized Nash bargaining which is defined as follows:
max
q ,d
[ν (q )−ρd ]φ[ρd (1+ sq )− c (q )]1−φ s.t. d ≤ z and c (q )≤ y .
The Nash bargaining solution is given a pair (q , d ) that satisfies the following conditions:
d = z and q = g −1(ρz )
where g (·) is defined as follows:
g (q ) =
φc (q )ν ′(q )+ (1−φ)ν (q )c ′(q )
φ(1+ sq )ν ′(q )+ (1−φ)c ′(q ) .
Given this bargaining outcome, we can rewrite the choice of zˆ by a household in CM as follows:
max
zˆ≥0 {−zˆ +βαh v (g −1(ρzˆ ))+β (1−αh)ρzˆ }
and the solution to this latter problem is given by:
1
βρ
=αh
ν ′(q )
g ′(q ) + (1−αh)
which can be rewritten using Fisher equation, 1/β = (1+ i )ρ, as follows:
i
M (1, 1−u ) =
ν ′(q )
g ′(q ) −1; (11)
where i is the nominal interest rate. Equation (11) will be referred to as the LW curve. This
curve represents the (q , u ) pairs that are consistent with the household optimization problem.
This curve determines the DM output, q , as in Lagos and Wight(2005), except in their model
αh was fixed and now αh =M (1, 1−u ). Moreover, in this environment the production subsidy,
sq also alters the incentives to produce in DM. The properties of the LW curve follow the well-
known result that simple conditions guarantee ν
′(q )
g ′(q ) is monotone, so there is a unique q solve
the previous condition with ∂ q
∂ u
< 0.
Proposition 1 Let q ∗ solve ν ′(q ∗) = c ′(q ∗). For all i > 0 the LW curve slopes downward in (u ,q )
space, with u = 0 and sq = 0 implying q ∈ (0,q ∗) and u = 1 implying q = 0. As i → 0, q → q0 for
all u < 1, where q0 is independent of u .
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We refer the reader to the appendix for the proofs of all our results.
An increase in u affects q because higher unemployment makes it less attractive to be a
buyer by adversely affecting the probability and/or terms of trade. The different subsidies con-
sidered in this paper change the incentives to produce more and possibly increase welfare.
According to Fisher equation 1/β = (1+ i )ρ, LW curve moves upward when inflation rate
pi= 1/ρ−1 decreases. This effect is intuitive: a high i increases the cost of holding money, and
thus lowers the trading quantity which is constrained by money holding of buyers. When the
subsidy to production sq increases, firm has larger incentive to recruit in the labor market and
this helps to reduce the unemployment.
Lemma 1 LW curve shifts upward, i.e., q is increasing for any given u , when monetary subsidy
to production sq increases or inflation rate pi decreases.
3.2 Nash Bargaining in LM
In the labor market, when a firm with a vacancy meets with an unemployed worker they bargain
over wage, w , with threat points given by their continuation values. Recall that the difference
in value functions between different employment status for a household are given by:
U he=1−U he=0 = (1−δ−λh)(V h1 (z )−V h0 (z ))
= (1−δ−λh)(W h1 (z )−W h0 (z ))
= (1−δ−λh)(w (1−τl )−b − l +β (1−δ−λh)Sˆh);
where Sˆh = w−(b+l )
1−β (1−δ−λh ) represents the steady state difference of the household’s continuation
values. From equation (6), we have that the difference in value functions between different
employment status for the firm is given by:
U fe=1−U fe=0 = (1−δ−λ f )(V f1 −V f0 )
= (1−δ−λ f )(R −w +β (1−δ)Sˆ f );
where Sˆ f = R−w
1−β (1−δ) is the steady state difference of the firm’s continuation value and the firm’s
revenues, R , which are given by:
R = y +α f [(1+ sq )ρz − c (q )].
Having specified the continuation values for the firm and the household, the Nash bargaining
problem with firm’s bargaining power η can be written as follows:
max
w

w (1−τl )−b − l +β (1−δ−λh)Sˆh1−η R −w +β (1−δ)Sˆ f η .
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The solution to this problem is given by:
w =
η[1−β (1−δ)]( b+l
1−τl )+ (1−η)[1−β (1−δ−λh)]R
1−β (1−δ)+ (1−η)βλh .
Knowing the household wage in the LM, w , as well as the firm’s revenues, R , we can sub-
stitute these expressions and determine the corresponding free entry condition, which is given
by:
k −a = λ f η
h
y − ( b+l
1−τl )+α f [(1+ sq )ρd − c (q )]
i
(r +δ)+ (1−η)λh ;
where r is the real interest rate.
To simplify things, let us use the Beveridge curve which describes the relationship between
unemployment and the job vacancy rate. In steady state we have that (1−u )δ=N (u , v )which
implicitly defines v = v (u ) so we can rewriteα f =
M (1,1−u )
1−u λ f =
N (u ,v (u ))
v (u ) , λh =
N (u ,v (u ))
u
. Recalling
that ρd = g (q ), the free entry condition can be written as follows
k −a =
N (u ,v (u ))
v (u ) η{y − ( b+l1−τl )+ M (1,1−u )1−u [(1+ sq )g (q )− c (q )]}
(r +δ)+ (1−η)N (u ,v (u ))
u
; (12)
which we refer from now on as the MP curve. The MP curve, given by equation (12), relates the
firm’s optimal (u ,q ) which depends on different tax instruments, namely, the production and
vacancy subsidies and the tax rate on labor income.
Proposition 2 The MP curve slopes downward in (u ,q ) space. It passes through (1,q ), where
q > 0, if (k −a )(r +δ)>η(y − b+l
1−τl ), and it passes through (u¯ , 0), where u¯ > 0, if (k −a )(r +δ)≤
η(y − b+l
1−τl ).
MP curve determines unemployment rate u as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), except
the total surplus (the term in braces) includes not just y − b+l
1−τl but also the expected gain from
trade in decentralized market. Different from Berentsen, Menzio and Wright(2010), the labor
market equilibrium can be driven by multiple fiscal policies. The following lemma summarizes
the effects of fiscal policy instruments on MP curve.
Lemma 2 MP curve moves upward when labor income tax rate τl or unemployment benefit
b increases. MP curve moves downward when monetary subsidy to production sq or vacancy sub-
sidy a increases.
Intuitively, there are three effects from an increase in u all of which encourage entry: (i) it
is easier for firms to hire; (ii) it is harder for households to get hired, which lowers w; (iii) it is
easier for firms to compete in the DM market.
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In contrast to the LW curve, labor income taxes and vacancy subsidy affect the firms’ optimal
(u ,q )which translate in shifts in the MP curve.
4 Monetary Equilibrium
We break the analysis of equilibrium into three parts. First, following Lagos-Wright (2005), we
determine the value of DM production measured by q , taking unemployment u as given, the LW
curve. We then determine u , taking q as given, as in Mortensen-Pissarides (1996) which yields
the MP curve previously derived. It is convenient to depict these two relationships graphically
in (u ,q ) space with the LW and MP curves, see Figure 2. Their intersection determines the equi-
librium unemployment rate and value of money (u ,q ), from which all of the other endogenous
variables easily follow.
Proposition 3 Steady state equilibrium exists. If (k − a )(r + δ) ≥ η(y − b+l
1−τl ), there is a non-
monetary steady state at (1,0) and monetary steady state may also exist. If (k −a )(r +δ)<η(y −
b+l
1−τl ), there is a non-monetary steady state at (u¯ , 0), where uˆ ∈ (0, 1), is the intersection between
MP curve and horizontal axis, and at least one monetary steady state. If the monetary steady
state is unique, a rise in i or b decreases q and increases u in equilibrium, while a rise in τl or a
increases q and decreases u in equilibrium.
As in Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2010), there may be multiple equilibria. The LW and
MP curves both slope downward in the (u ,q ) space. LW curve enters (u ,q ) space from the left at
(0,q 0) and exits from the right at (1, 0). When the expected cost of creating a vacancy is greater
than its benefit, i.e., (k − a )(r +δ) ≥ η(y − b+l
1−τl ), MP curve enters (u ,q ) space from the top at
(u ,q 0) and exits from the right at (1,q1). In this case, there exists a non-monetary equilibrium
at (1, 0) and, depending on parameter values, monetary equilibria may also exist(see the curves
labeled M P2 and M P3). If (k − a )(r +δ) < η(y − b+l1−τl ), MP curve enters from the top at (u ,q 0)
and exits from the bottom at (u¯ , 0)(see the curve labeled M P1). In this case, a non-monetary
equilibrium exists at (u¯ , 0)3 as well as at least one monetary equilibrium.
Aruoba, Rocheteau and Waller (2007) emphasize that in the Lagos and Wright (2005) frame-
works, Nash bargaining generates non-monotonic surpluses for buyers which lead to inefficient
3In the first type of non-monetary equilibrium, as (1, 0), both DM and LM markets shut down, the equilibrium
degenerates to a standard Walrasian equilibrium with home production. In the second type of non-monetary equi-
librium, as (u¯ , 0), only DM market shuts down and some workers are still employed in the LM market to produce
general goods. This is similar to an equilibrium in the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model.
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Figure 2: Monetary equilibrium.
DM production. Moreover, from Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) if the Hoisos condition is not
satisfied, the economic environment will have inefficient outcomes. These two properties are
inherited by our environment, thus leaving a role for monetary and fiscal policies. To deter-
mine the set of policies capable of implementing efficiency, we first characterize the efficient
allocation in the next section.
5 Efficient Allocation
The social planner’s problem can be summarized as follows:
J (u ) =max
q ,v
{(1−u )y +αh[ν (q )− c (q )]+u l −v k +β J (uˆ )}
s.t. uˆ = u +(1−u )δ−N (u , v )
Notice that the choice of q does not depend on state variable u . The first-order condition
with respect to q is simply ν ′(q ) = c ′(q ). The first-order condition with respect to v is −k −
β J ′(uˆ )N2(u , v ) since current vacancies will affect unemployment rate in the next period. This
fact together with the law of motion uˆ = u +(1−u )δ−N (u , v ) generates a decision rule for v
as a function of u , determining the optimal combination of (u , v ).
Using the envelope theorem, we have the following:
J ′(u ) = l − y −M2(1, 1−u )+β J ′(uˆ )[1−δ−N1(u , v )].
Substituting this last expression into the first-order condition with respect to v , we have the
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Figure 3: Uniqueness of efficient allocation.
following social planner’s Euler equation:
k
βN2(u , v ) = y − l +M2(1, 1− uˆ )[v (qˆ )− c (qˆ )]+
k [1−δ−N2(uˆ , vˆ )]
N1(uˆ , vˆ ) .
In steady state, the planner’s solution generates an optimal unemployment u ∗ that satisfies
the following relationship:
k =
N2(u ∗, v (u ∗))y − l +M2(1, 1−u ∗)[v (q ∗)− c (q ∗)]
r +δ+N1(u ∗, v (u ∗))
Proposition 4 When the matching technologies in the LW and DM are given byN (u , v ) = uσv 1−σ
andM (B ,S) = BγS1−γ, respectively, then there exists a unique social optimal plan given by θ ∗ ≡
v ∗
u ∗ and q
∗.
Figure 3 provides a graphical summary of Proposition 4. Now that the first best is character-
ized we can determine if fiscal and monetary instruments can implement such an allocation.
6 Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policies
The government’s problem consists of choosing inflation, unemployment benefits, tax and sub-
sidy rates that maximize social welfare subject to the constraint that production and consump-
tion in all markets are stationary monetary equilibria. Thus, we are contemplating an environ-
ment in which the government sets an inflationary and fiscal plan that will not change over
time. In the next subsection we explore if there exists a set of policies that can replicate the
social planer’s allocation (u ∗, v ∗,q ∗).
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6.1 Benchmark
As a baseline situation, let us consider an economy where the government does not provide
unemployment insurance, b , nor vacancy subsidy, a , then there is no need to have taxes on
labor, τl = 0, nor taxes on dividend income τd = 0. Let us further assume that the government
sets production subsidy sq = s ∗q , the subsidy rate that can achieve efficient trade quantity q ∗ in
DM for any given matching probability αh . The next lemma ensures that it is possible to do so.
Lemma 3 Consider any given value of the buyer’s bargaining power, 0 < φ ≤ 1, and any given
inflation rate, pi≥ β −1. Then, there exists value s ∗q that achieves the first-best allocation in DM
market.
Lemma 3 indicates that, by using proper production subsidy rate s ∗q , efficiency in decen-
tralized market can always be achieved for any unemployment level u . The extra revenue from
subsidies to trade encourages sellers to be more generous in the DM bargaining and produce up
to the efficient level. However, subsidies in DM may also create problem in both high inflation
and inefficiency in LM. On the one hand, given that the government has access to lump-sum
monetary taxes, government can always undo the inflation that results from these subsidies.
On the other hand, the efficiency in LM creates the role for other fiscal policy instruments.
Following Gomis-Porqueras and Peralta-Alva (2010), the monetary authority injects money
at different times within a period as to pay a production subsidy in the DM as well as to affect
the money supply at the end of CM. Thus the corresponding budgets constrains are then:
α∗f s
∗
qq
∗ =τDM z ∗
(1+τDM )(1+τC M ) = 1+pi
Observe that the availability of lump sum monetary transfers at the end of the centralized
market can neutralize any increase of the money supply from the payment of monetary sub-
sidies at the centralized market (where we measure inflation). Thus we can deviate from the
Friedman rule.
The resulting labor market equilibrium, MP curve, can be written as follows:
[(r +δ)θσ+(1−η)θ ]k =η{y − l +(1+δθσ−1)γ[(1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗)− c (q ∗)]}.
Rearranging the social planner’s solution and the equilibrium MP curve, respectively; we
have the following relationships:
[(r +δ)θσ+σθ ]
k
(1−σ) = y − l +(1+δθ
σ−1)γ(1−γ)[ν (q ∗)− c (q ∗)] (EF)
[(r +δ)θσ+(1−η)θ ]k
η
= y − l +(1+δθσ−1)γ[(1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗)− c (q ∗)]. (MP)
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In this search environment, there exist efficiency issues in both LM and DM markets. While the
government uses subsidy s ∗q to correct the trade inefficiency in DM, the efficient unemployment
rate θ ∗ is not guaranteed if there is no further policy interference. We use θM P to denote the
equilibrium market tightness when sq = s ∗q has been chosen. We summarize the relative value
of θM P when compared to θ ∗ in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 When the trade efficiency is attained by setting q M P =q ∗, we have following prop-
erties regarding market tightness θM P in LM:
• whenσ= 1−η(Hosios’ rule) and (1−γ)[ν (q ∗)−q ∗] = (1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗)− c (q ∗), θM P = θ ∗;
• whenσ> 1−η and (1−γ)[ν (q ∗)−q ∗]≤ (1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗)− c (q ∗), θM P >θ ∗;
• whenσ< 1−η and (1−γ)[ν (q ∗)−q ∗]≥ (1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗)− c (q ∗), θM P <θ ∗.
Proposition 5 is intuitive. The efficiency in LM depends on whether firms and workers are
properly compensated in the matching and bargaining process of both LM and DM. When Ho-
sios’ rule holds, the conventional inefficiency in LM is eliminated. However, on top of Ho-
sios’ rule, firms and workers need to be compensated by their contribution to DM matching
so that the efficiency in LM can be virtually implemented. This happens when (1− γ)[ν (q ∗)−
q ∗] = (1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗)− c (q ∗), where the LHS is firm’ contribution to generating surplus in DM
and the RHS is firm’s real payoff in DM as an equilibrium outcome. When σ ≥ 1 − η and
(1− γ)[ν (q ∗)− q ∗] < (1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗)− c (q ∗), firms are favored in the bargaining of both LM and
DM and have larger incentive to post vacancies. Therefore, θM P > θ ∗. The θM P < θ ∗ result can
be seen through a similar reasoning. However, when bargaining in LM is firm-biased(worker
biased) and bargaining in DM is worker-biased(firm-biased), the value of market tightness is
not clear since these opposite effects may counterbalance each other to various degree.
An immediate implication of our previous results is that, when we implement efficiency in
DM by choosing s ∗q , efficiency in labor market may not be achieved. This is the case as it de-
pends on the underlying parameters governing the matching processes in the labor and goods
market as well as the bargaining power of firms and workers. In the next subsection we explore
if active fiscal policies can help us achieve efficiency.
6.2 Active Fiscal Instruments and Efficiency
An important insight of the previous section was the importance of the DM production subsidy
in helping achieve the efficient production in the DM. Thus, after setting s ∗q , the government
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needs to choose a vacancy subsidy, a , unemployment insurance (or tax), b , and labor income
tax rate ,τl , to move MP curve such that efficiency in LM and DM markets can be achieved. In
other words, we need to specify policies such that θM P = θ ∗ and q = q ∗. In order to determine
the right set of policies we need to determine the efficient labor market gap, i.e., θM P −θ ∗.
Recall that the MP curve was given by:
(r +δ)θσ+(1−η)θ  k −a
η
= y − b + l
1−τl +(1+δθ
σ−1)γ[(1+ s ∗q )g (q
∗)− c (q ∗)].
From Lemma 2, we know that the MP curve shifts downward(i.e., u decreases for any fixed q )
in (u ,q ) space when the vacancy subsidy, a , increases or unemployment benefits, b , decreases.
Intuitively, if government wants a larger vacancy-unemployment ratio θ = v
u
, the government
can either raise firms’ incentive to recruit, or lower unemployment workers’ welfare, or do both.
For an initial set of fiscal and monetary policies, if the vacancy-unemployment ratio is higher
than efficient level, θM P > θ ∗, government may want to tax firms or subsidize the unemployed.
Thus, in principle (u ∗,q ∗) is an allocation on the equilibrium MP curve.
Before we determine the appropriate policy instruments, we need to consider the different
possibilities when sq = s ∗q . First, if the MP curve is to the right of (u ∗,q ∗), the government can
change the MP allocations by increasing τl , increasing a or decreasing b until the MP curve
crosses (u ∗,q ∗). Then using the appropriate combination of policies we can construct a pair of
LW and MP curves that crosses at (u ∗,q ∗). In order to be an efficient market equilibrium, the
policy instruments τl , τd , a and b need to satisfy the government budget constraint which is
given by:
v ∗a +u ∗b =τd Í∗ +α∗f τ∗l w
which holds at every date. The fact that τd has no effect on the LW and MP curves, is going to be
important as this instrument can help the government balance its budget. After the government
sets a , b and τl to shift the MP curve so that LW and MP curves cross at (u ∗,q ∗), then the fiscal
authority choosesτd to balance the budget.
However, if the MP curve is to the left of (u ∗,q ∗) when sq = s ∗q , θM P < θ ∗, it is still possible
to achieve efficiency by setting a < 0, thus moving MP curve to the right. But since we can at
most set a =−k , efficiency in DM market can not be resorted if MP curve is too far away from
(u ∗,q ∗).
Define ζ as follows:
ζ=
(1−γ)[v (q ∗)−q ∗]
(1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗, s ∗q )− c (q ∗)
Generally, if ζ > 1, the government can always achieve labor market efficiency by setting
positive a , b and τl as stated in the following proposition.
17
LW (s∗q)
LW
MPMP (s
∗
y)
q∗
q
u = 1
MP ′u∗
b ↑, a ↓, τl ↓
sq > 0
b ↓, a ↑, τl ↑
Figure 4: Existence of optimal policies.
Proposition 6 When Hosios’ rule holds. Labor market efficiency can be achieved through appro-
priate fiscal policies {a ∗,b ∗,τ∗l ,τ∗d } such that they satisfy the following conditions:
k
k −a =
y
y − b+l
1−τl
= ζ
v ∗a ∗+u ∗b ∗ = τ∗d Í∗ +α∗f τ∗l w .
• when firms are favored in both LM and DM, i.e.,
σ> 1−η and (1−γ)[v (q ∗)−q ∗]≤ (1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗)− c (q ∗)
to achieve labor market efficiency, the government needs to implement a small positive or
even negative a and increase τl and b .
• when workers are favored in both LM and DM, i.e.,
σ< 1−η and (1−γ)[v (q ∗)−q ∗]≥ (1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗)− c (q ∗)
to achieve labor market efficiency, government needs to implement small positive or even
negative τl , increase a and decreases b .
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6.3 Numerical Example
For a given parameterization, the government’s problem can be easily solved with standard
numerical methods. For ease of comparison with existing analysis, we follow closely the pa-
rameterization of Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2010). These authors consider the following
preferences
v (q ) =
A ∗q (1−α)
1−α ;
and the values for the underlying parameters are β= 0.992, l =0.1, y= 3, A=1.86, δ=0.05 k=8,
σ= 0.28, γ=0.28, η=0.28,φ=0.275 andα=0.17. Given this structure we analyze the quantitative
implications for optimal fiscal and monetary policies.
For this particular parametrization we find that there exist a unique monetary equilibrium.
Nevertheless, there are multiple fiscal and monetary policies that yield the efficient allocation.
The optimal fiscal and monetary policies are reported in Table 1 where pi=β−1, τl =b=0 with
optimal unemployment, vacancy, DM production 0.076, 0.037 and 12.863, respectively.
Table 1: Welfare Maximizing Policies
Policies Values
sq 0.356
τd 0.547
a 0.282
With this particular parametrization, we obtain a unique monetary equilibrium that ex-
hibits an endogenous long run Phillips curve. Moreover, the environment is such that a labor
tax as well as unemployment benefits are redundant instruments. This is the case as the the
government is able to implement a vacancy subsidy that shifts the MP curve enough so that
(u ∗,q ∗) belongs to both the MP and LW curves in equilibrium.
7 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the interactions between
monetary and fiscal policies in an economic environment with microeconomic foundations
for fiat money and unemployment. The underlying framework is tractable where search-and-
bargaining frictions are considered as to create a role for money and to deliver unemployment
as equilibrium outcomes.
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One of our main results is to show that, even when terms of trade in the decentralized mar-
ket are given by Nash’s bargaining solution, some of the inefficiencies in the Berentsen, Men-
zio and Wright (2010) framework can be restored with appropriate fiscal policies. In particu-
lar, when lump sum monetary transfers are possible, a production subsidy financed by money
printing can increase output in the decentralized market and a vacancy subsidy financed by a
dividend tax even when the Hosios’ rule does not hold.
We also showed there exist multiple subsidies and (sometimes strictly positive) inflation
rates that yield the efficient allocation. The Friedman rule is one of the possible policy options
that yields efficiency and is always an optimal policy regardless of the bargaining power of the
buyer.
Finally, under any of the operating procedures for monetary and fiscal policy considered in
this paper, with or without lump sum taxes, large welfare gains are achieved by having fiscal
and monetary policies in place. Thus, ignoring active fiscal policies can be quite costly.
The findings of this paper confirm the conjecture of Kocherlakota (2005) and Wright (2005)
that fiscal and monetary policies have important interactions in frameworks with micro foun-
dations for the existence of fiat money; thus, they should always be jointly considered in the
design of optimal government policy.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The LW curve , determines q for a given u exactly as in Lagos and Wright(2005), except
for the production subsidy qs in g ′(q ). We implicitly impose mild assumption to guarantee ν
′(q )
g ′(q )
is globally decreasing in q . Examples of such conditions can be: (i) ν ′ is log-concave; or (ii)
φ ≈ 1. Thus, when u increases, the LHS of equation (11) increases, q will decrease as ν ′(q )
g ′(q ) is a
decreasing function of q and therefore LW curve is downward slopping.
If u = 0 and sq = 0, q < q ∗ as in Lagos and Wright(2005). If u = 1, it implies that the LHS of
(11) goes to∞ and therefore q → 0 as ν ′(0) =∞. When workers own full bargaining power, i.e.
φ = 1, and Friedman rule i → 0 is implemented, we have ν ′(q )
c ′(q ) → 1, i.e., q → q ∗. Furthermore,
when i → 0, the RHS of (11) goes to 0 so that q is independent of u .
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. It is straightforward to see when u is fixed, q decreases as i increases, given that ν
′(a )
g ′(q ) is
decreasing in q . From the representation of g (q , sq ) and by applying implicit function theorem,
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we have that
∂ q
∂ sq
=− φzν ′(q )
φ[−ν ′+ν ′′(z (1+ sq )−q )]− (1−φ)ν ′ .
Thus, given ν ′ ≥ 0, ν ′′ < 0 and z (1+ sq )−q ≥ 0, we have ∂ q∂ sq ≥ 0. Therefore, a higher monetary
subsidy to production shifts the LW curve upward.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. First, notice that N (u ,v )
v
and M (1,1−u )
1−u are increasing in u , while
N (u ,v )
u
is decreasing in u .
Then, when other parameters are unchanged, a higher u will lead to a lower q when q ≤ q ∗
given that g ′(q ) > 0. MP curve is thus downward slopping in (u ,q ) space. Second, time both
sides of equation (12) by (r +δ)+ (1−η)N (u ,v )
u
, we have
(k −a )(r +δ)+ (1−η)N (u ,v (u ))
u

= N (u ,v (u ))
v (u ) η{y − (
b + l
1−τl )+
M (1,1−u )
1−u [(1+ sq )g (q )− c (q )]}.
The LHS reaches its minimum when N (u ,v )
u
→ 0. And the RHS reaches its maximum when
N (u ,v )
v
→ 1 and M (1,1−u )
1−u → 1. Thus, if
(k −a )(r +δ)≥η

y − b + l
1−τl +

(1+ sq )g (q ∗)− c (q ∗),
the market will shut down. Finally, suppose (k −a )(r +δ)≥ ηny −h b+l
1−τl
io
, q must be positive
at u = 1, otherwise the above equation can not hold.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The effect of policy instruments a , b andτl on u and q are immediate from the equation
(12). Also notice that
d (1+ sq )g (q )
d sq
= g (q )+ (1+ sq )
d g (q )
d q
d q
d sq
≥ 0.
This implies that when u and other parameters are fixed, q decreases as sq increases.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We only focus on steady state equilibrium. When (k −a )(r +δ)≥ η(y − b+l
1−τl ), MP curve
crosses (1,q ) by lemma 2. It is clear from figure 2, the MP curve may(e.g. M P2) or may not(e.g.
M P3) intersect with LW curve. However, since LW curve crosses (1, 0), there always exists a non-
monetary steady state where there is no production and trade at all. When (k − a )(r + δ) <
η(y − b+l
1−τl ), MP curve enters (u ,q ) space from (u¯ , 0)(e.g. M P1). Therefore, there exists a non-
monetary steady state (u¯ , 0) and at least one monetary steady state(e.g. point A in figure 2).
There may exist multiple monetary steady state(e.g. point B and C in figure 2).
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Suppose monetary steady state exists. Because both LW and MP curves are downward slop-
ping, any shift of one curve creates a new monetary equilibrium(if it exists) with u and q chang-
ing in opposite directions. By lemma 1, a higher i makes LW curve move downward and thus
decrease q and increases u . By lemma 2, a rise in a or τl , or a decrease in b makes MP curve
shift upward and thus leads to a steady state with higher q and lower u .
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. By choosing Cobb-Douglas matching technologies and using Beveridge curve uN (1,θ ) =
N (u , v ) = (1 − u )δ, we have N1(u , v ) = σθ 1−σ, N2(u , v ) = (1 − σ)θ−σ and M2(1, 1 − u ) =
(1−γ)(1+σθσ−1)γ. The social planner’s optimal choice can be written as
[(r +δ)θσ+σθ ]k = (1−σ)y − l +(1−γ)(1+δθσ−1)γ[v (q ∗)− c (q ∗)]
The left hand-side(LHS) tends to 0 as θ → 0 while tends to∞ as θ →∞. And
∂ LHS
∂ θ
= [(r +δ)θσ−1+1]σk > 0
The right hand-side(RHS) tends to∞ as θ → 0 while tends to H = (1−σ)y − l +(1−γ)[v (q ∗)− c (q ∗)].
And
∂ RHS
∂ θ
=−(1−σ)2(1−γ)γσ[v (q ∗)− c (q ∗)](1+δθσ−1)γ−1 < 0
Thus, there exists an unique θ ∗ which satisfies the social optimality. Given q ∗ is also unique,
there exist an unique social optimal plan given by θ ∗ and q ∗.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Given the L-W curve iM (1,1−u ) =
ν ′(q )
g q (q ,sq )
−1 and assume c (q ) =q , where
g q (q , s ) =
φ(1+ sq )ν ′(q )2+(1−φ)ν ′(q )− (1−φ)φν ′(q )[(1+ sq )ν (q )−q ]
[φ(1+ sq )ν ′(q )+1−φ]2
The optimal policy requires the government to pick sq given q such that g q (q , s ) = 1 which is
the true marginal cost. Such a policy eliminates any bargaining inefficiency that arises. Under
such a subsidy policy we have then
i
M (1, 1−u ) = ν
′(q )−1
which means q only depends on i . As a result setting i = 0(i.e. pi = β − 1) eliminates the time
cost of holding money yields q ∗. Given this policy we can now solve for the optimal subsidy. We
have
1=
φ(1+ sq )ν ′(q )2+(1−φ)ν ′(q )− (1−φ)φv ′′(q )[(1+ sq )ν (q )−q ]
[φ(1+ sq )ν ′(q )+1−φ]2
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which is a quadratic equation in sq . Imposing ν ′(q ∗) = 1 we can solve for a positive s ∗q . Also
notice that, given i = 0 is chosen, s ∗q does not depend on u .
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Comparing the social planer’s allocation (EF) and the market equilibrium allocation
(MP), we can consider three different cases.
Case 1:σ= 1−η. The matching elasticity with respect to u , uN2(u ,v )N (u ,v ) , is σ under our Cobb-
Douglas specification. Hosios(1990) states that the labor market efficiency is going to be achieved
whenever the bargaining power reflects party’s contribution to matching, i.e. σ = 1−η. Thus
this scenario satisfies the so-called Hosios’ rule. In this case, the LHS of equation (EF), and the
LHS of equation (MP) are equal for same market tightness θ . Thus, if the RHS of equations (EF)
and (MP) satisfy
(1−γ)[ν (q ∗)− c (q ∗)] = (1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗)− c (q ∗)
we must have that the equilibrium labor market tightness θM P equals to the efficient tightness
θ ∗. This in turn implies that the optimal policy scheme (s ∗q ,pi∗) implements the efficient out-
come in both markets.
Now suppose that (1−γ)[ν (q ∗)−q ∗]> (1+s ∗q )g (q ∗)−q ∗. Then, for the same market tightness
θ , the RHS of equation (EF) is larger than the RHS of equation (MP). As a result, we have that
θM P < θ ∗ when q M P = q ∗. Similarly, if (1−γ)[ν (q ∗)−q ∗] < (1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗)−q ∗, we have θM P > θ ∗
given that q M P =q ∗.
Case 2:σ> 1−η. The Hosios’ rule is no longer holding due to the excessive bargaining power
of firms. The LHS of equation (EF) is larger than the LHS of equation (MP) for same θ . If (1−
γ)[ν (q ∗)−q ∗]≤ (1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗)−q ∗, we must have that θM P ≥ θ ∗ when q M P = q ∗. If (1−γ)[ν (q ∗)−
q ∗]> (1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗)−q ∗, the relative value of θM P when compared to θ ∗ is ambiguous.
Case 3:σ< 1−η. The Hosios’ rule is not satisfied due to the excessive bargaining power of
workers. The LHS of equation of (EF) is smaller than the LHS of equation (MP) for same θ . If
(1−γ)[ν (q ∗)−q ∗]≥ (1+s ∗q )g (q ∗)−q ∗, we must have θM P ≤ θ ∗ when q M P =q ∗. If (1−γ)[ν (q ∗)−q ∗]<
(1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗)−q ∗, the relative value of θM P when compared to θ ∗ is ambiguous.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. First, suppose that Hosios’ rule holds. From equations (EF) and (12), it is easy to see θ ∗
can be achieved in labor market if and only if k
k−a ,
y
y− b+l1−τl
and (1−γ)[ν (q ∗)−c (q ∗)](1+s ∗q )g (q ∗)−c (q ∗) are of the same value.
The first two fractions can be adjusted by choosing policy instruments a , b and τl . Whether the
efficiency can be resorted depends on the value of the last fraction.
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Suppose that (1−γ)[ν (q ∗)−c (q ∗)](1+s ∗q )g (q ∗)−c (q ∗) = ζ> 1. All we need is to choose a , b and τl such that
k
k −a =
y
y − b+l
1−τl
= ζ
This can be easily done by choosing nonnegative policy instruments. Suppose that ζ < 1.
Now we need to choose negative a and τl . But since the entry tax a can not be less than −k
and τl is also restricted by budget constraint, the feasible set of policies is restricted. Thus, only
when ζ is not too small, efficiency can be achieved.
When Hosios’ rule does not hold, choice of policy becomes complicated as it depends on the
detailed parameters of matching and bargaining process. However, the direction which heads
to efficiency is clear. When
σ> 1−η and (1−γ)[v (q ∗)−q ∗]≤ (1+ s ∗q )g (q ∗)− c (q ∗),
the MP curve determined by (MP) is lower than (u ∗,q ∗) by proposition 5. Thus, large b and
τl , and small(or even negative) a should be chosen. Similar argument can be formed for the
opposite case.
Of course, all policy combinations above should satisfy government’s budget constraint
v ∗a ∗+u ∗b ∗ =τ∗d Í∗ +α∗f τ∗l w .
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